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Eric Foner's Reconstruction1 provides the most comprehensive and in-
sightful overview available for a period in American history over which
judges and other members of the legal community have wrangled with
uncommon ferocity. That much-debated period embraces the years imme-
diately following the Civil War, years that witnessed the enactment of
measures aimed at knitting together a polity torn apart by one of the
bloodiest armed conflicts to erupt in the Western Hemisphere. The most
significant of these measures were the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, as well as accompanying
legislation designed to insure their ratification or enforce their guarantees.
Histories of Reconstruction provoke unusually strong reactions because
the most contentious issues of that era-the status of blacks in American
life and the relationship of the states to the federal government-remain
flashpoints of controversy today. Nothing more securely links Reconstruc-
tion to the present than the constitutional and statutory law enacted then
that remains on the books, powerfully affecting the texture of our current
political life. One thing that cements this linkage is the popular, albeit
contested, belief that "original intent" should play an important, if not
decisive, role in determining how statutes and constitutional provisions are
applied in resolving contemporary controversies.2 Hence, judges' findings
on the history of Reconstruction have affected the resolution of fundamen-
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2. Debate over the propriety and methodology of originalism has given rise to a large literature.
See, e.g., Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1 (1985) (reprinting addresses by
Justices William L. Brennan and John Paul Stevens and former Attorney General Edwin Meese III);
Aleinkoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988); Brest, The Misconceived
Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479 (1987); Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Prob-
lem-The Role of the Intent of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U.L. REv. 811 (1983);
Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REv. 885 (1985); Schlag,
Framer's Intent: The Illegitimate Uses of History, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 283 (1985).
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tal and highly-charged disputes such as whether state power is limited by
the Bill of Rights' and whether de jure segregation contravenes federal
constitutional protections.4 In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,' cur-
rently the most widely-watched case on the Supreme Court's docket, much
of the debate has revolved around the relative persuasiveness of two
sharply divergent historical interpretations of the origins and development
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.6
This review is guided by two goals. The first is to describe the main
features of Reconstruction and encourage members of the legal commu-
nity to read it. Lawyers and judges (along with the citizenry at large)
make important decisions that are informed by their sense of history.7
That being so, it is imperative to apprise them of new perspectives that
illuminate the past. Unfortunately, even relatively sophisticated legal com-
mentators act as if, having once studied American history, they have no
need to keep up with current historiographical developments.' The-second
goal of this review is a subset of the first. I hope to help sensitize readers
of law reviews to the politics of historical scholarship, to the fact that
"historical judgments, while by no means exercises in unconstrained or
subjective creativity, necessarily involve elements of creativity and inter-
pretive choice." 9
3. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51-54 (1947); id. at 61-67 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); id. at 71-75 (Black, J., dissenting); see also M. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE
(1986); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The Original
Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
4. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Compare id. at 489 (investigation of
circumstances surrounding adoption of Fourteenth Amendment produces "inconclusive" evidence on
original intent of framers) with id. at 492 (in determining constitutionality of segregation in public
education "we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted"). See also R.
BERdER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segre-
gation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955).
5. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, No. 87-107 (U.S. filed July 17, 1987), rearg ordered, 108
S. Ct. 1419 (1988).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 65-68.
7. Cf E. MAY, "LESSONS" OF THE PAST: THE USE AND MISUSE OF HISTORY IN AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY (1978):
Men and women making decisions under conditions of high uncertainty necessarily envision
the future partly in terms of what they believe to have happened in the past. Their under-
standing of the present is shaped by what they think to have gone before. Often, their knowl-
edge of what in fact occurred earlier is shallow or faulty, and deficiencies in information breed
greater deficiencies in reasoning. Having learned not to trust inexpert guesswork where num-
bers, economic models, or scientific formulas are concerned, perhaps they will see that they
also need clearer understanding of the history that so often imprisons them.
Id. at 190.
8. For instance, Professor Charles Fairman's voluminous contributions to the legal history of Re-
construction provide information useful to all students of the period. I refer here in particular to his
most recent books Reconstruction and Reunion, 1864,88, Part Two (1987) and Five Justices and
the Electoral Commission (1988). Remarkably and regrettably, however, his scholarship ignores much
of the best work done in Reconstruction studies over the past twenty years. See also Kennedy, Race
Relations Law and the Tradition of Celebration, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622, 1636 n.58 (1986) (criti-
cizing analysis of Chief Justice Edward Douglass White that relied upon Traditionalist Reconstruc-
tion history and ignored more recent and accurate historical studies).
9. See Powell, Rules for Originalists, 73 VA. L. REV. 659, 660-61 (1987).
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Part I of this review analyzes historiographical traditions that have cre-
ated conflicting images of Reconstruction and the social functions these
images have served. Part II describes Foner's work against the backdrop
of previous interpretations. Part III explores the relationship between
Foner's political commitments and his academic craft and thus touches
upon an issue that vexes all intellectual work that implicates important
political decisions.
I.
Foner begins his study with an analysis of Reconstruction historiogra-
phy, a subject once aptly described as a "dark and bloody ground."1
Foner explains that the history of historical writing on Reconstruction has
proceeded through at least three distinct phases-Traditionalist, Revision-
ist, and Post-Revisionist-each of which reflected in part the imperatives
of the era in which the writers lived. Throughout the first half of this
century, the leading white scholars of Reconstruction portrayed it in an
intensely negative fashion." According to this pejorative Traditionalist in-
terpretation, the central outrage of the period was the elevation of the
Negro to civil and political equality. 2 Arming blacks with the ballot was
10. See Weisberger, The Dark and Bloody Ground of Reconstruction Historiography, 25 J.S.
HisT. 427 (1959): see also W.E.B. DuBois, The Propaganda of History, in BLACK RECONSTRUC-
TION IN AMERICA 711-29 (1935); K. STAMPP, The Tragic Legend of Reconstruction, in THE ERA
OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865,,877, at 3-23 (1965); Beale, On Rewriting Reconstruction History, 45
Am. HisT. REv. 807 (1940); Belz, The Civil War Amendments to the Constitution: The Relevance of
Original Intent, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY 115 (1988); Belz, The New Orthodoxy in Reconstruction
Historiography, I REvs. AM. HisT. 106 (1973); Foner, Reconstruction Revisited, 10 REvs. AM.
HisT. 82 (1982); Franklin, Whither Reconstruction Historiography, 17 J. NEGRO ED. 446 (1948);
Lynch, Some Historical Errors of James Ford Rhodes, 2 J. NEGRO Hisr. 345 (1917); Meier, An
Epitaph for the Writing of Reconstruction History?, 9 REvs. Am. HIST. 97 (1981); Simkins, New
Viewpoints of Southern Reconstruction, 5 J.S. HIST. 49 (1939); Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A
Critique of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 651 (1979).
11. See, e.g., C. BOWERS, THE TRAGIC ERA (1929); J. BURGESS, RECONSTRUCTION AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1902); E. COULTER, THE SOUTH DURING RECONSTRUCTION, 1865C,1877 (1947);
W. DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC, 1865,,1877 (1907); J. RHODES,
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE COMPROMISE OF 1850 (1893-1906).
12. Describing how Reconstruction ruined blacks morally, Claude Bowers maintains the
following:
[Ilts crusade of hate and social equality ... [played] havoc with a race naturally kindly and
trustful. Throughout the War, when [white] men were far away on the battle-fields, and the
women were alone on far plantations with the slaves, hardly a woman was attacked. Then
came the scum of Northern society, emissaries of the politicians, soldiers of fortune, and not a
few degenerates, inflaming the negroes' egotism, and soon the lustful assaults began. Rape is
the foul daughter of Reconstruction.
C. BowERs, supra note 11, at 307-08.
Bowers' work was not the most intellectually impressive of the pejorative tradition in Reconstruc-
tion historiography; that distinction belongs to the scholarship of William A. Dunning. But what is
best from a scholarly point of view often diverges from what is most popular. Bowers' middle-brow
rendition of Reconstruction's history may well have had more of an influence on non-academic wield-
ers of power-judges, legislators, executives-than Dunning's more reserved writings. Keeping in
mind that Dunning was a professor at Columbia University who served as President of both the
American Historical Association and the American Political Science Association, it is well to consider
this passage from his classic Reconstruction, Political and Economic:
The negro had no pride of race and no aspiration or ideals save to be like the whites. With
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portrayed as a particularly cruel, opportunistic, and stupid provocation. It
was cruel because the Radical Republicans, the major political force sup-
porting the civil and political rights of blacks, were motivated-so the ar-
gument ran-by a desire to humiliate the defeated white South. It was
opportunistic because the Radicals acted out of no authentic solicitude for
the former slaves but desired instead simply to control and exploit the
black vote for partisan purposes. Finally, it was stupid because the Radi-
cals invested heavily in a futile policy; blacks were unfit to vote and south-
ern whites were determined to prevent them from long exercising that
privilege.
In the denigratory version of Reconstruction, black participation in
southern politics consisted of "Negro rule," fiscal laxity, rampant corrup-
tion, and the galling tyranny of military occupation. The South's recon-
structed state governments were the first in the nation in which blacks
participated to a substantial extent as voters and representatives. But Pro-
fessor John W. Burgess spoke for many of the country's leading white
academics when he remarked that these governments constituted "the
most soul-sickening spectacle that Americans had ever been called upon to
behold."' 3 The only bright side to the story was the "redemption" of the
southern states by whites who, determined to install "good government"
and "home rule," were forced to resort to stern measures against the
blacks and their white "carpetbagger" and "scalawag" allies.
One reason the pejorative interpretation of Reconstruction held sway
for so long was that it fitted well with the racist presuppositions of white
scholars and their audiences. It served an important ideological function
by helping to rationalize the relegation of blacks to a separate and une-
qual status in every aspect of social and political life-particularly in the
civil rights and political power, not won, but almost forced upon him, he came gradually to
understand and crave those more elusive privileges that constitute social equality. A more inti-
mate association with the other race than that which business and politics involved was the end
toward which the ambition of the blacks tended consciously or unconsciously to direct itself.
The manifestations of this ambition were infinite in their diversity. It played a part in the
demand for mixed schools, in the legislative prohibition of discrimination between the races in
hotels and theatres, and even in the hideous crime against white womanhood which now as-
sumed new meaning in the annals of outrage.
W. DUNNING, supra note 11, at 213-14. On Dunning's views on race and Reconstruction, see Don-
ald, Introduction to W. DUNNING, ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION (1965);
Harper, William A. Dunning: The Historian as Nemesis, 10 CiV. WAR HIsT. 54 (1964); Muller,
Look Back Without Anger: A Reappraisal of William A. Dunning, 61 J. AM. HIST. 325 (1974). A
comprehensive analysis of Reconstruction's images in American culture is a project in need of an
author. It would need to examine not only works of history and biography but also fiction such as
Thomas Dixon's The Clansman (1905) and films such as D.W. Griffith's 1915 sensation Birth of A
Nation (Epoch Production Corporation 1915). Cf. Gross, The Negro in the Literature of the Recon-
struction, in IMAGES OF THE NEGRO IN AMERICAN LITERATURE (S. Gross & J. Hardy eds. 1966).
13. J. BURGESS, supra note 11, at 263. Burgess was professor of political science and constitu-
tional law at Columbia University and also served as dean of the faculty of political science. His
scathing denunciation of the Reconstructed state governments in the South was closely linked to his
racial views. "The claim that there is nothing in the color of the skin is a great sophism," he once
declared. Quoted in Simkins, supra note 10, at 58. "A black skin means membership in a race of men
which has never succeeded in subjecting passion to reason." Id.
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South, where Jim Crow segregation emerged as a formalized system of
racial subordination. The pejorative tradition also rationalized the federal
government's laissez-faire attitude towards local racial practices that be-
trayed the Reconstruction Amendments. After all, the pejorative tradition
showed the "wisdom" of keeping blacks "in their place" by painting a
lurid picture of what occurred the last time blacks were allowed to partici-
pate in Southern politics. As Francis B. Simkins observed, Traditionalist
historians "described the follies and rascalities of Negro politicians and
their Carpetbagger friends so as to make the [white] reader thankful that
such knavery cannot be repeated in his time."'14
The second major phase of Reconstruction historiography, Revisionism,
culminated in the early 1960's. Revisionists had carefully modified or re-
futed aspects of the pejorative interpretation throughout the 1940's and
1950's. 5 Its status as the reigning paradigm for understanding Recon-
struction was not decisively diminished, however, until the Civil Rights
Movement overcame the segregation regime.1" At that point, Reconstruc-
tion history was itself reconstructed. To some degree, Revisionism
stemmed from an accumulation of new knowledge. But what primarily
generated this new outlook were the keenly-felt imperatives of new moral
and political values, particularly with respect to race relations. The Revi-
sionist attack on traditional portrayals of Reconstruction reflected and re-
inforced efforts in many areas of intellectual endeavor to rehabilitate what
Professor George M. Frederickson calls "the black image in the white
mind."'" What Franz Boas and Gunnar Myrdal sought to do for anthro-
pology and sociology, 8 Revisionists sought to do for history-liberate it
14. Simkins, supra note 10, at 48. In the 1950's, segregationists were among the first to analogize
the Civil Rights Movement to the First Reconstruction. Reciting the pejorative tradition's litany of
horrors, they warned against, and then bewailed, the adoption of racial reforms that they feared
would bring about a second tragic era. Dissenting bitterly against a judgment invalidating segregation
aboard a municipal bus service in Birmingham, Alabama, Judge Ben F. Cameron designated emanci-
pation as the origin of the southern race problem and, citing Claude Bowers' The Tragic Era, urged
his colleagues to remember the lessons of Reconstruction, that "period which all Americans recall
with sadness and shame. . . ." Boman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 292 F.2d 4, 15 (5th Cir. 1961);
see also N. MCMILLEN, THE CITIZEN'S COUNCIL: ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE SECOND RE-
CONSTRUCTION, 1954c,64, at 357-83 (1971); Bloch, A Second Tragic Era-The Role of the Lawyer
In It, 24 ALA. LAW. 386 (1963).
15. See, e.g., V. WHARTON, THE NEGRO IN MISSISSIPPI, 1865c1890 (1947); Beale, supra note
10; Cohen, Northeastern Business and Radical Reconstruction: A Re-examination, 46 Mo. VALLEY
.HIST. REV. 67 (1959); J. Cox & L. Cox, General 0.0. Howard and the 'Misrepresented Bureau',
19 J.S. HIsT. 427 (1953); Donald, The Scalawag in Mississippi Reconstruction, 10 J.S. HIST. 447
(1944). These and other contributions are conveniently collected in RECONSTRUCTION: AN ANTHOL-
OGY OF REVISIONIST WRITINGS (K. Stampp & L. Litwack eds. 1969).
16. The high-point of revisionism in Reconstruction historiography is Kenneth Stampp's The Era
of Reconstruction, 1865c48 7 7, which was published in 1965-the same year that Congress passed
the Voting Rights Act.
17. G. FREDERICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND (1971).
18. See D. SOUTHERN, THE USE AND ABUSE OF AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1987); Hovenkamp,
Social Science and Segregation Before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 668-72.
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from the dogmatic assumption that blacks are a separate and inferior spe-
cies of humankind. 9
In reconsidering the central figures and deeds of the Reconstruction era,
Revisionists emphasized the humanitarian impulse animating reform, the
fairness of the federal and reconstructed state governments, the introduc-
tion into the South of useful innovations such as public schooling, the fact
that white and black reconstructionists were no more corrupt or irrespon-
sible than other politicians, and, most of all, the democratization of polit-
ics-never before in southern history had a broader cross-section of the
populace been engaged in selecting its political representatives. As one
leading Revisionist put it:
[G]ranting all their mistakes, the radical governments were by far
the most democratic the South had ever known. They were the only
governments in southern history to extend to Negroes complete civil
and political equality, and to try to protect them in the enjoyment of
the rights they were granted. The overthrow of these governments
was hardly a victory for political democracy, for the conservatives
who 'redeemed' the South tried to relegate poor men, Negro and
white, once more to political obscurity.20
While the pejorative tradition portrayed Reconstruction as a nightmare
from which the nation mercifully awoke, Revisionism portrayed it as a
dream superseded by a nightmare.
Despite their differences, Traditionalists and Revisionists largely agree
that Reconstruction had truly been radical. However, in the 1970's and
1980's a substantial number of historians began to question that assump-
tion. Post-Revisionists emphasize the shared antipathy the white North
and the white South felt toward blacks, the way the lives of many blacks
were left untouched by formal changes in national policy, and the commit-
ment of even "radical" Republicans to antebellum conceptions of federal-
ism. Post-Revisionists, in short, emphasize the conservative nature of Re-
construction, the extent to which it represented the triumph of continuity
over reform. 2
19. See generally Brock, Race and the American Past: A Revolution in Historiography, 52 HIsT.
49 (1967), Starobin, The Negro: A Central Theme in American History, 3 J. CONTEMP. HIST. 37
(1968).
20. K. STAMPP, supra note 16, at 184-85.
21. As is the case with the other categories of historical writing I have labelled for the sake of
convenience, Post-Revisionism embraces a wide range of scholarship characterized by significant dif-
ferences. Raoul Berger is a Post-Revisionist of sorts insofar as he stresses the narrowness of the rights
that the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments originally intended to bestow upon the freedpe-
ople. R. BERGER, supra note 4. The purpose behind Berger's scholarship, however, is profoundly
conservative, if not reactionary. As a descriptive matter, he argues that the modern Supreme Court
has expanded the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment far beyond the original intent of its Fram-
ers. As a normative matter, he argues that judges should not broaden the Amendment's meaning.
Unlike Berger, the legal historian Michael Les Benedict offers no programmatic proposals on the
basis of his historical research. His work may seem politically conservative at first blush insofar as he
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Like its predecessors, Post-Revisionism was related to contemporary de-
velopments. The accent on beneficent reform that suffused many Revi-
sionist portraits of Reconstruction stemmed from the revolution in race
relations thought to be sweeping the United States in the 1950's and
1960's. The stress that some Post-Revisionists placed on continuities of
black subordination derived from a new consciousness of the persistence of
racism and its intimate association with class oppression.2 2 This aware-
ness was honed by disappointment with the failure of the Civil Rights
Movement to make a greater impact on blacks' fortunes, particularly the
black poor. Criticisms of the economic inadequacies of the Civil Rights
Movement were echoed by claims that the First Reconstruction had been
doomed from the outset by the Republicans' failure to provide economic
support-"forty acres and a mule"-to the newly emancipated slaves.
Images associated with these three historiographical phases have both
reflected and conditioned the ways in which members of the legal commu-
defends the Supreme Court from the widely-believed charge that it purposefully sabotaged Recon-
struction legislation due to racial indifference or hostility. Benedict, Preserving the Constitution: The
Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruction, 61 J. AM. HisT. 65 (1974); Benedict, Preserving
Federalism: Reconstruction and the Waite Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REV. 39. But the real thrust of
Benedict's message is not apology but a broader indictment of mid-nineteenth-century American polit-
ics, in particular a conception of federalism that prevented even well-intentioned Republicans from
pursuing policies that may have more effectively protected the newly emancipated slaves. Blame, he
contends, should not be placed primarily at the door of the Supreme Court, but rather at the door of
those who framed the laws and Amendments the Court was obliged to interpret.
Although Post-Revisionism emerged as a major tendency in Reconstruction historical studies in the
1970's, several historians had earlier sounded several of its themes. In 1939, for instance, Professor
Simkins observed:
A truly radical program would have called for the confiscation of land for the freedman. Land
was the principal form of Southern wealth, the only effective weapon with which the ex-slaves
could have battled for economic competence and social equality. . . . Conservative constitu-
tional theory opposed any such meaningful enfranchisement. The dominant Radicalism of the
day naively assumed that a people's salvation could be obtained through the ballot and the
spelling book.
Simkins, supra note 10, at 55-56; see also Meier, Negroes in the First and Second Reconstructions
of the South, 13 CIv. WAR HisT. 114 (1967) ("[Wjhat occurred during reconstruction was really not
a genuine revolution, not even an abortive one.").
For other examples of Post-Revisionist scholarship, see M. BENEDICT, A COMPROMISE OF PRINCI-
PLE: CONGRESSIONAL REPUBLICANS AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1863,1868 (1974); L. GERTEIS,
FROMs CONTRABAND TO FREEDOM: FEDERAL POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN BLACKS, 1861 ,1865
(1973); W. GILLETrE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION, 1869,=,1879 (1979); Woodward, Seeds of
Failure in Radical Race Policy, in AMERICAN COUNTERPOINT: SLAVERY AND RACISM IN THE
NORTH-SouTH DIALOGUE 163 (1971).
22. See McKitrick, Reconstruction: Ultraconservative Revolution, in THE COMPARATIVE AP-
PROACH TO AMERICAN HISTORY 146 (C.V. Woodward ed. 1969); see also Rosenberg, Toward a
New Civil War Revisionism, 38 AM. SCHOLAR 250 (1969). Examining the Civil War and Recon-
"struction with questions generated by ghetto rebellions and the Vietnam War, Rosenberg asked:
Are we so accustomed to organized violence that we automatically accept without question the
conclusion that the Civil War was justified even though it merely loosened the shackles of
slavery? Can we be so sure that the privilege of moving from the plantation to the ghetto is
worth the death and destruction of a brutal war?
Id. at 267. For a spirited debate over Rosenberg's questions, see Paludan, The American Civil War:
Triumph Through Tragedy, 20 CIV. WAR HIST. 239 (1974); Paludan, Taking the Benefits of the
Civil War Seriously: A Rejoinder to John S. Rosenberg, 21 CtV. WAR HIs-r. 254 (1975); Rosenberg,
The American Civil 51ar and the Problem of "Presentism": A Reply to Phillip S. Paludan, 21 CIv.
WAR HisI'. 242 (1975).
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nity think about Reconstruction. The Traditionalists' negative portrayals
of Reconstruction affected, for instance, a broad spectrum of judicial opin-
ion, including even the most learned and sophisticated of the Justices. In
1945, in a case of racially motivated violence involving a criminal prosecu-
tion pursuant to Reconstruction-era enforcement legislation, Justices
Owen J. Roberts, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert H. Jackson declared
that "[it is familiar history that much of this legislation was born of that
vengeful spirit which to no small degree envenomed the Reconstruction
era. Legislative respect for constitutional limitations was not at its height
and Congress passed laws clearly unconstitutional.""3 In another case in
which Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, broadly derided Reconstruc-
tion legislation, he solemnly cited as authority one of the most extreme of
the Traditionalist historians.24 Reconstruction probably continues to evoke
for many a vague sense of distress. When pressed a few years ago at Yale
Law School to justify his decision in a voting rights case25 that adversely
affected the interests of black voters, the late Justice Potter Stewart
blurted that, as far as he was concerned, "Reconstruction is over."26 This
answer was strange in that the question to which it responded made no
reference to Reconstruction. The answer was instructive, however, in that
it evidenced a perception of Reconstruction that moved the Justice to em-
brace affirmatively the notion that it was about time for the Second Re-
construction to end.
The Revisionist portrayal of Reconstruction is the image that is now
most prevalant and influential. That dominance is best illustrated by the
unqualified praise typically showered upon the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
and Fifteenth Amendments. The legal literature is full of critiques of judi-
cial decisions or social practices that are said to misinterpret or betray the
enactments of the Reconstruction era. But legal commentators have writ-
ten little that focuses upon flaws in the enactments themselves.
Post-Revisionism is of lesser influence in the legal culture than its his-
23. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 140 (1945) (Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson, JJ.,
dissenting). In Screws the Court reversed the conviction of white policemen who beat to death a young
black man in "a shocking and revolting episode in law enforcement." Id. at 92. The Court reversed
the conviction because the trial judge did not instruct the jury that, in order to find the defendants
guilty, it had to conclude that the policemen had acted with the specific purpose of depriving their
victim of a federal constitutional right. Justices Roberts, Frankfurter and Jackson argued in favor of
an even more narrow reading of the relevant legislation. The "familiar history" that the Justices
referred to probably stemmed from Claude Bowers' portrayal of Reconstruction. See infra text accom-
panying note 11. In the 1960's, new Justices, new priorities, and a new understanding of the Recon-
struction era facilitated rulings that largely nullified Screws. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787
(1966); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
24. See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 656-57, 657 n.8 (1951) (citing C. Bowers, The
Tragic Era).
25. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1981).
26. I heard Justice Stewart make this remark during the 1980-1981 school year at Yale Law
School. He is quoted by others as having made that same statement during the same year in similar
circumstances in his Chambers. See Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy. The Intent Standard
and Equal Protection Law, 92 YALE L.J. 328, 350 (1982).
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toriographical counterparts. One well-known commentator, however, who
does propound Post-Revisionist themes is Professor Derrick Bell. In his
text Race, Racism and American Law, Bell contends that "[t]he period
from the end of the Civil War to 1877 saw the basic rights of blacks to
citizenship established in law, but precious little accomplished to ensure
their political and economic rights. ' 27 "Without the latter," he writes,
"the former proved, then as so often today all but worthless."28
II.
Foner's Reconstruction provides an excellent vantage from which to
evaluate critically the imagery of his subject. He synthesizes a vast body of
existing scholarship and employs his own extensive examination of pri-
mary materials to produce the finest history we have of the period that
bequeathed to us the second founding of the nation.29
Foner examines the broad array of other issues that faced the Nation in
the aftermath of Civil War, including monetary and industrial policy, im-
migration, agitation for women's rights, and the wars against Native
Americans. But at the center of Foner's study is the race question, the
troubling subject to which all other issues of political importance were
inextricably linked: the terms on which blacks were to be made part of the
American polity. The "Negro question" assumed primacy on the national
political agenda in part because of the insistence of an influential sector of
the Republican party passionately committed ideologically to erasing all
racial limitations that, as a matter of law, prevented blacks from exercis-
ing the same rights available to whites. The race question also assumed
primacy because of an intensely practical political problem: the fortunes of
the Republican party-its ability to remain in control of the federal gov-
ernment-were intimately tied up with the fate of the Negro. To lend aid
to the newly freed slaves risked triggering the resentments of a white
Northern electorate that was largely racist. On the other hand, to leave
blacks unprotected would not only have meant alienating the humanita-
rian wing of the party. It would also have meant relinquishing a potential
counterforce to the sector of southern society that had led the attempt to
establish the Confederacy. Unwilling to subject the South to a colonial
status indefinitely, the Republican party was forced to consider ways,
compatible with accepted democratic norms, to wrest control of the region
from the former secessionists. The strategy ultimately settled upon was
27. D. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 34 (2d ed. 1980).
28. Id.
29. Reconstruction is the culmination of a series of studies that Foner has contributed to the study
of nineteenth centur-i American history over the past twenty years. See E. FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE
LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970);
E. FONER, NOTHING BUT FREEDOM: EMANCIPATION AND ITS LEGACY (1983); E. FONER, POLITICS
AND IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR (1980); Foner, Reconstruction Revisited, 10 REV.
AM. HiST 82 (1982).
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arming black men with the ballot. What added special urgency to the
Republicans' task was the ironic fact that the South emerged from the
Civil War with potentially more congressional power than it had previ-
ously enjoyed. The Constitution of 1787 counted each slave as only three-
fifths of a person for purposes of determining a state's allotment of con-
gressional representation.30 The abolition of slavery thus enhanced the
congressional representation of the Southern States.
What is most distinctive about Foner's analysis is the way he portrays
blacks as active, articulate, and important participants in the making of
Reconstruction. Emphasizing the centrality of the Negro is by no means
novel; as Foner himself has repeatedly acknowledged,3" W.E.B. DuBois
did precisely that in 1935 in his neglected masterpiece Black Reconstruc-
tion.3 But Foner elaborates upon the theme with unparalleled detail and
insight, and ventures beyond existing scholarship by showing the interre-
lationships that linked racial struggle in the South to the broad national
issues that faced the country at large in the aftermath of civil war.
Foner's attentiveness to the ideas and conduct of blacks in Reconstruc-
tion-most of whom were illiterate former slaves-will be of particular
interest to legal commentators interested in discerning contributions to the
meaning of law that have been made by people on the lower rungs of the
social order; people without official roles as authors or interpreters of le-
gal texts; the masses that are often rendered invisible by elitist historical
studies. 3 He delineates ways in which Negroes defined for themselves
what freedom should mean and reveals methods by which they sought to
bring into existence their aspirations.
Characteristic of his analytic style is his discussion of the Emancipation
Proclamation, the executive order that freed all slaves in jurisdictions in
rebellion against the federal government. In addition to focussing on Pres-
ident Abraham Lincoln's conception of the Emancipation Proclamation,
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
31. Foner is notably punctilious in crediting scholars whose work has nourished his own. More-
over, in Reconstruction and other writings, he has made a point of both (1) calling attention to the
disgraceful way in which white historians wrongly ignored the scholarly contribution of their black
colleagues and (2) carefully noting the special role that black academics have played in Reconstruction
historiography. See Pp. xxi, 610-11; E. FONER, NorHTNc; BuT' FREEDOM, supra note 29, at 5-6.
Throughout the long period when the pejorative tradition constituted the dominant paradigm of sound
learning, black historians (and a few whites) writing primarily in the Journal of Negro History
propounded, documented, and refined the Revisionist arguments that are now dominant. See A.
MI.FR & E. RUDWICK, BLACK HISrIORY AND THE HITI'ORICAt. PROFESSION, 1915-1980 (1986).
32. W.E.B. DuBois, supra note 10; see also SOUTHERN BI.ACK LEADFRS OF THE RE.CONSTRUC-
TION ERA (H. Rabinowitz ed. 1982) (collecting scholarships on blacks' role in Reconstruction).
33. See, e.g., Forbath, Minow & Hartog, Introduction: Legal Histories From Below, 1985 Wis.
L. REv. 759, 760 (describing genre of legal history that seeks to "highlight the contribution to the
meaning of law made by people with no official roles in the hierarchy of legal authority."); Matsuda,
Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. RE'v. 323
(1987); see also W. WIEMEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISI.AVERY CONSITUTIONA.ISM IN AMERICA,
1760-1848 (1977). Arguing that constitutional historians need to be more inclusive in their concerns
and sources, Professor Wiecek maintains that "[c]onstitutional development was (and is) not a monop-
oly of a hieratic caste of judges and lawyers." Id. at 7.
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Foner emphasizes the meaning that blacks gave the document. In certain
respects, the Proclamation is remarkably narrow. It contained no criticism
of slavery and did not even free all slaves; at least 800,000 remained unaf-
fected." ' Because of the limitations, one historian has suggested that the
Emancipation Proclamation displayed all the "moral grandeur of a bill of
lading."35 Yet blacks read the Proclamation as an inspirational charter.
The revolutionary meaning they assigned to it is indicated by the response
of a group of slaves living in a union-controlled section of South Carolina.
When news of Lincoln's signing arrived, they recited prayers and
speeches, then sang none other than "My Country, 'Tis of Thee.""6
Foner's discussion of blacks' post-slavery legal consciousness sheds light
upon the formative influence of events that have received all too little at-
tention. He emphasizes, for instance, the consequences that stem from the
fact that large numbers of blacks fought in the Civil War; by its end,
180,000 had served in the Union Army-a number that represented about
one-fifth of the country's male black population under age forty-five.
"Within the army," Foner writes, "black soldiers were anything but
equal to white."13 7 They were isolated in all-black units led almost always
by white officers. They were frequently abused by their white superiors
and typically relegated to performing the most menial tasks. They were
initially paid less than their white counterparts. On the other hand, the
Union army provided the forum in which many former slaves "saw the
impersonal sovereignty of the law supersede the personal authority of the
master."3 8 In the army, thousands of blacks learned to read and received
their first lessons in the rudiments of republicanism. Their experience had
a profound impact, for, as one white northerner observed, black soldiers
had "learnt what it is to be free and . . . will infuse their feelings into
others."3 9 Validating this prediction, black soldiers angrily protested racial
inequality in compensation, prompting Congress to enact a measure as-
suring equality in pay. Soldiers, moreover, were typically among the
blacks least afraid of returning Confederate veterans. Recognizing his for-
34. The Emancipation Proclamation did not free those held in bondage in the four slave states
that remained loyal to the Union-Missouri (the locus, ironically, of Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S.
(19 How.) 393 (1856)), Delaware, Kentucky and Maryland. Nor did it affect slaves in certain south-
ern territories under Union control. See p. 1; see also J. FRANKLIN, THE EMANCIPATION PROCLA-
MATION (1962). These rather large exceptions moved the London Spectator to observe that the under-
lying principle of the Proclamation was "not that a human being cannot justly own another, but that
he cannot own him unless he is loyal to the United States." Quoted in Rosenberg, supra note 22, at
'264 n.*.
35. R. HOFSTADTER, THE" AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 131 (1948). On the other hand,
the Emancipation Proclamation did free over three million slaves, making it in the words of Charles
and Mary Beard, "the most stupendous act of sequestration in the history of Anglo Saxon jurispru-
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mer master among a group of military prisoners, one black soldier was
heard to exclaim: "Hello massa; bottom rail top dis time."40
The Union victory doomed slavery. But what did "freedom" mean to
the emancipated slaves and what did they do with this strange new
power? In answering these questions, Foner puts to best advantage an
impressive feature of his work: a finely-tuned appreciation for the texture
of ordinary lives. Living securely on this side of freedom, even a trained
observer may overlook the significance that emancipated slaves attached to
the exercise of personal liberties that may now seem too banal to merit
notice. Foner recognizes, however, that these liberties significantly defined
the former slaves' conception of freedom. "Blacks relished," he writes:
opportunities to flaunt their liberation from the innumerable regula-
tions. . . associated with slavery. Freedmen held mass meetings and
religious services unrestrained by white surveillance, acquired dogs,
guns, and liquor (all barred to them under slavery), and refused to
yield the sidewalks to whites. They dressed as they pleased, black
women sometimes wearing gaudy finery, carrying parasols, and re-
placing the slave kerchief with colorful hats and veils.4'
In the antebellum South, blacks had been forbidden to travel without
passes. But with emancipation, blacks took to the roads with a notable
enthusiasm. "Right off colored folks started on the move," a former slave
in Texas recalled. "They seemed to want to get closer to freedom, so
they'd know what it was-like it was a place or a city."" 2
The conception of freedom held by newly emancipated slaves displayed
other features as well, the most pervasive of which was a thirst for auton-
omy that prompted changes in family life, religious observance, and modes
of labor. Blacks persistently sought "to escape from white supervision and
establish a modicum of economic independence." 3 Many became trans-
fixed by the dream of becoming an owner of land. "Gib us our own land
and we take care ourselves," remarked one black South Carolinian. "[B]ut
widout land, de ole masses can hire us or starve us, as dey please."""
Participation in politics also became an element in many blacks' con-
ception of freedom. "You never saw a people more excited on the subject
of politics than are the negroes of the South," observed a planter in 1867.
"They are perfectly wild."' 5 Blacks enrolled in organizations like the





44. Id. Viewing the situation from a different perspective, a white Georgia planter observed that
the blacks "will almost starve and go naked before they will work for a white man if they can get a
patch of ground to live on." Id.
45. P. 283.
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bates. They drafted petitions to local authorities protesting such things as
the exclusion of blacks from juries or failures to arrest white criminals.
They attended rallies and Republican party conventions. They voted in
defiance of hardship and ran for office even when doing so entailed lethal
danger. Between 1870 and 1877, sixteen blacks were elected to Congress;
eighteen to positions as state lieutenant governors, treasurers, secretaries
of state, or superintendents of education; and at least six hundred to state
legislatures. "Rarely," Foner writes, "has a community invested so many
hopes in politics as did blacks during Radical Reconstruction.""'
Those hopes were ruthlessly smashed. Blacks never exercised decisive
control of any southern state government, even in states like Mississippi
and South Carolina where they held voting majorities. But for a short
period, they did wield sufficient power to insist upon policies that pro-
vided support for their steep climb from slavery: the provision of public
education; laws relatively favorable to workers, debtors, and tenants; and
prohibitions against racially discriminatory conduct on the part of the
state. By 1877, however, every southern state had fallen under the control
of white opponents of Reconstruction who sought openly to reimpose the
norms of racial subordination. Within two decades, they had succeeded
overwhelmingly, erecting structures of racial oppression so entrenched and
complex that they are still being undone.
The demise of Reconstruction is traceable to many sources: Northern
white racism and indifference; judicial rulings that invalidated or nar-
rowed important congressional initiatives; administrative weaknesses of
the federal government; the dulling influence of Republican party func-
tionaries who were devoid of the humanitarian commitments that had in-
spired their forbearers; and the debilitating consequences of economic de-
pression. The factor, however, that Foner emphasizes most in explaining
the downfall of Reconstruction is political terrorism. According to him,
"the wave of counterrevolutionary terror that swept over large parts of the
South . . . lacks a counterpart either in the American experience or in
that of the other Western Hemisphere societies that abolished slavery in
the nineteenth century."4 Anti-reconstructionists of all social classes re-
sorted to violence of the most brutal sort including rape, mutilation, and
murder in order to intimidate blacks and their white allies.
Foner's study indicates ways in which various images of Reconstruction
need modifying. He rightly rejects the notion that Reconstruction consti-
tuted little more than a reformist gesture condemned to failure by the
unwillingness of the Radical Republicans to distribute land to the emanci-
pated slaves. Politically, Foner has much in common with progressive
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egalitarianism. They also share a critical view of the political-economic
vision of the Republican Party. Indeed, one of Foner's important contri-
butions is his discerning, dialectical critique of the Republicans' free labor
ideology. On the one hand, the ideology of free labor powerfully indicted
slavery and animated insistence that blacks be accorded basic civil rights,
particularly the right to hold property and make contracts. On the other
hand, the free labor ideology tended to limit the willingness of Republi-
cans to use government power to support economically the new freedom of
the blacks.
Foner makes two important points, however, that Post-Revisionists tend
to minimize unduly. First, economic status, while important, is not neces-
sarily decisive in political matters. Whites resorted to terror because they
were unable to control blacks simply with market pressures. Reconstruc-
tion was overcome "not because propertyless blacks succumbed to eco-
nomic coercion, but because a politically tenacious black community,
abandoned by the nation, fell victim to violence and fraud."' Second, in
evaluating Reconstruction, one should keep in mind not only its unful-
filled goals but also its starting point-slavery-and the record of other
societies that previously legalized slavery. When those considerations are
brought to bear, we see the problem with declaring that during Recon-
struction "little" was accomplished to ensure the political and economic
rights of Blacks. "Little" compared to what? Compared to slavery, the life
bequeathed to ordinary blacks by Reconstruction was a great improve-
ment. And compared to what occurred in other societies, the treatment
accorded America's emancipated slaves was remarkable indeed. "Alone
among the nations that abolished slavery in the nineteenth century, the
United States, within a few years of emancipation, clothed its former
slaves with citizenship rights equal to those of whites." '49 These rights, of
course, have frequently faced de facto nullification. Yet it should be ap-
preciated that Reconstruction helped to close off even worse alternatives:
The post-Reconstruction labor system embodied neither a return to
the closely supervised gang labor of antebellum days, nor the com-
plete dispossession and immobilization of the black labor force and
coercive apprenticeship systems envisioned by white Southerners in
1865 and 1866. Nor were blacks, as in twentieth-century South Af-
rica, barred from citizenship, herded into labor reserves, or prohib-
ited by law from moving from one part of the country to another. As
illustrated by the small but growing number of black landowners,
businessmen, and professionals, the doors of economic opportunity
that had opened could never be completely closed. Without Recon-
struction, moreover, it is difficult to imagine the establishment of a




The Politics of Scholarship
created a vehicle for future federal intervention in Southern affairs.
As a result of this unprecedented redefinition of the American body
politic, the South's racial system remained regional rather than na-
tional, an outcome of great importance when economic opportunities
at last opened in the North."
Foner's account also illuminates aspects of Reconstruction that remain
shaded or ignored altogether by the overly laudatory image that Revision-
ists have sometimes created. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments are often praised as if they were the flawless products of
undiluted efforts on behalf of the former slaves. But the Reconstruction
Amendments were as much the product of morally ambiguous bargaining
as the document they altered. The Thirteenth Amendment passed the
Congress by an exceedingly narrow margin in 1865; 5' a year earlier the
Amendment had failed to gain the necessary votes. The Fourteenth
Amendment was condemned by Wendell Phillips and other strong sup-
porters of the Blacks as "a fatal and total surrender" 2 because it not only
failed to enfranchise blacks, but implicitly recognized the right of states to
restrict the ballot to whites. What Phillips was referring to was section
two of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides for a reduction in rep-
resentation in proportion to the number of male citizens denied the suf-
frage.53 The Fifteenth Amendment finally provided a degree of federal
constitutional protection for black voters. But instead of directly en-
franchising blacks,54 the Amendment merely bars states from excluding
persons from the franchise on the basis of race-a provision that invites
(and has attracted) all manner of evasion. Noting that the Fifteenth
Amendment would not forbid literacy, property, and educational tests that
50. Pp. 602-03; see also G. FREDERICKSON, WHITE SUPREMAC:Y: A COMPARATIVE. STUDY IN
AMERICAN AND SOITH AFRICAN HISTORY (1981).
51. Foner writes surprisingly little about the history of the Thirteenth Amendment or the political
struggle that led to its passage and ratification. The "first" Thirteenth Amendment was sent by Con-
gress to the states for ratification in March 1861. It would have provided explicit constitutional pro-
tection for slavery. It was killed, ironically, with the coming of the Civil War. The "second" Thir-
teenth Amendment, the one that abolished slavery, did not obtain Congressional approval when it was
first voted upon in 1864. Later, in a second attempt to gain Congressional approval, President Lincoln
was forced to the edge of legality, if not beyond, to insure passage of the Amendment. Considerable
evidence suggests that Lincoln used secret promises of presidential patronage to obtain the votes of
certain key members of the House of Representatives. J. NOONAN, BRIBISs 455-59 (1984).
52. P. 255.
53. See U.S. CONs'T. amend. XIV, § 2:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective
numbers. . . . But when the right to vote at any [federal] election . . is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State . . . or in any way abridged . . . the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
54. Congress rejected i proposal that would have barred states from excluding persons from vot-
ing or holding office on the basis of "race, color, nativity, property, education or religious beliefs." P.
446; see also supra note 53.
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could effectively exclude most blacks from the polls, Representative Henry
Wilson decried its language as "lame and halting."55
It should be clear that Foner rejects the pejorative tradition in Recon-
struction historiography; no one can sensibly charge that he is soft on the
Traditionalist perspective. He has been attacked, however, from a very
different direction. Professor David Donald complains that Foner "over
idealizes the black community," '56 creating a portrait of blacks that is both
artificially homogeneous and spuriously wholesome. "[I]t would be wel-
come," Donald writes, "to find in [Foner's] pages a freedman who was
less than heroic."' 57 Donald's charge, however, is woefully inaccurate. It
inexplicably slights Foner's discussion of black women's actions in Freed-
men's Bureau courts against physically abusive lovers and husbands,5" his
analysis of bitter class and color divisions within black communities,59 his
exploration of ideological struggles among blacks over contending political
strategies,60 and his exposure of corruption within the ranks of black of-
ficeholders. 6 ' W.E.B. DuBois once observed with respect to the founders
of the pejorative tradition in Reconstruction historiography that "they
[could not] conceive of Negroes as men." 2 Taking that complaint to heart,
Foner conceives of blacks as men and women"5 and accepts all that that
implies-disappointing failure as well as surprising triumph.
55. P. 446; cf Jackson, The United States Constitution: Black Americans Made It What It Is
Today, AM. VISIONS, Feb. 1988, at 23 ("The Fifteenth Amendment ... was a weakling. Instead of
affirming black voting rights, it merely denied states the right to deprive any individual of the right to
vote on racial grounds. . . . Poll taxes and literacy tests were the baneful fruit of this ineffective
amendment.").
The narrowness of the language of the Fifteenth Amendment stemmed less from specifically anti-
black impulses than desires to limit the power of various other groups in American society, particu-
larly the Chinese, the foreign-born, the poor and the illiterate. Pp. 446-47.
56. Donald, Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 1, 1988, at 41, 42.
57. Id.; cf. D. DONALD, THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1863-1867, at xii-xiii (1965) (sug-
gesting that historians "have understandably been wary of pursuing researches which might be mis-
used to promote present-day bigotry or racial strife").
58. P. 88.
59. See pp. 100-01, where Foner describes color prejudice among Negroes and notes that while
"free blacks welcomed the end of slavery ... many resented the elimination of their unique status
and feared being submerged in a sea of freedmen."
60. See, e.g., p. 65.
61. See pp. 384-91.
62. Quoted at p. xxi.
63. Although the gender question plays a subordinate role in Foner's history to issues involving
race and class relations, he does attend carefully to ways in which Reconstruction affected the public
status of women differently than that of men, see pp. 255-56, and the status of black women differ-
ently than that of both black men and white women, see pp. 86-88. He explores the background to
and ramifications of the bitterly ironic fact that while feminists played an important role in the aboli-
tionist movement, the women's movement actually lost ground during Reconstruction. With the Four-
teenth Amendment, the gender line that had implicitly sanctioned discrimination against women was,
for the first time, explicitly inscribed upon the face of the federal Constitution. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 2 ("[Wjhen the right to vote at any election...is denied to any of the male inhabi-
tants of such State. . .the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proporqon which the
number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens. . .in such State.")
(emphasis added).
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III.
Looming behind Professor Donald's specific complaint is the broad is-
sue that has served as a theme throughout this Book Review: the ways in
which politics inescapably affects scholarship. I have already suggested
that Reconstruction historiography is particularly interesting in this re-
gard because of its immediate and practical links to divisive contemporary
issues. Another reason why the relationship of politics to scholarship may
be of special interest here has to do with the biography of Professor Foner
himself. He came of age intellectually and politically during the late
1960's and has always been a scholar of the Left. Then, as now, a major
issue for self-conscious progressives concerned whether, or the way in
which, one should express one's politics in scholarly work. Some have
opted to fashion their scholarship into ideological weaponry serving imme-
diate political ends."' Others have decided to engage in the difficult, but
far more fruitful, task of expressing their politics without forsaking the
independent claims of their intellectual craft. Reconstruction is an exem-
plary accomplishment of an intellectual who has chosen this latter course.
Foner's own moral and political perspectives are readily apparent in
Reconstruction. He clearly champions racial, sexual, and economic egali-
tarianism. Yet, throughout his study he displays a disciplined respect for
the pastness of the past. This sometimes leads to conclusions that are po-
litically awkward. A striking example of this relates to Patterson v. Mc-
Lean Credit Union,65 an employment discrimination case pending before
the Supreme Court. Patterson involves, among other things, the scope of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.66 The plaintiff and her allies contend that
the Act was clearly intended by Congress to apply against private persons
who refuse to enter into contracts with blacks on the basis of race, as well
as against states that restrict the contractual powers of blacks.6" The op-
posing view is that originally the Act was clearly intended to address only
the discriminatory acts of states .6  Foner does not attempt to settle the
64. Many "sound," conventional scholars do this all the time but without self-consciousness!
Much legal history, for instance, constitutes a "scholarly form of lawyer's patriotism." See Kennedy,
supra note 8; see also Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing of American Legal His-
tory, 17 AM. J. LEG. HisT. 275 (1973).
65. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, No. 87-107 (U.S. filed July 17, 1987), rearg ordered,
108 S. Ct. 1419 (1988).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
67. Brief for Petitioner on Reargument at 14-54, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union (U.S.) (No.
87-107).
68. Brief for Respondent on Reargument, at 12-93, Patterson (U.S.) (No. 87-107). The historical
debate in Patterson is the latest reprise in a long-standing controversy. Compare Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422-44 (1968) (history indicates that Congress intended 42 U.S.C. § 1982
to extend to private parties as well as governmental actors) with id. at 454-76 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(history indicates that Congress intended 42 U.S.C. § 1982 to apply only to state actors). See also C.
FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1868, PART ONE 117-1258 (1971); Casper,
Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. CT. REv. 89; Kinoy, Jones v. Mayer
Co.: An Historic Step Forward, 22 VAND. L. REv. 475 (1969).
1989]
The Yale Law Journal
legal-political issue of how far the Civil Rights Act should now be deemed
to reach. What he does indicate, however, is that, as an historical matter,
the issue is muddled and provides no clear answer in favor of either side.
Writing in a studiously ambiguous fashion that itself replicates the intrac-
tably complicated reality he seeks to portray, Foner observes that the Act
of 1866 "honored the traditional presumption that the primary responsi-
bility of law enforcement lay with the states, while creating a latent fed-
eral presence, to be triggered by discriminatory state laws. . . .[D]espite
its intriguing reference to 'customs' that deprived blacks of legal equality,
the Civil Rights Bill was primarily directed against public, not private,
acts of injustice."6 He considers it a weakness that the Republicans failed
to perceive adequately the danger that private power posed to the fragile
freedom of the emancipated slaves. He no doubt wishes that they had
displayed more insight. Yet he steadfastly refuses to confuse what actually
occurred with wishful thinking about what should have occurred. °
Foner's stance is complicated by the pressures that our legal apparatus
exerts upon historical investigations. The courts are often historians' clos-
est link to practical political power. That link is a source of both tempta-
tion and vulnerability: it tempts historians to exercise influence and ren-
ders them vulnerable to lawyers and judges who merely deploy historical
scholarship as a weapon of persuasion.7 ' Foner addresses these pressures
explicitly in discussing the Fourteenth Amendment. In that discussion, he
takes the unusual step of disclaiming both the ability and the authority to
settle the questions that purportedly prompt lawyers and judges to turn to
historians.7 '2 First, confessing an inability to establish what lawyers refer
to as "the original intent" of the Fourteenth Amendment, Foner main-
tains that all he is able to supply is a complicated understanding of a wide
variety of shifting aims within the political and ideological context of
1866. Second, he contends that history cannot unilaterally determine its
69. P. 245.
70. Professor Foner has joined a distinguished array of historians in submitting an amicus curiae
brief to the Supreme Court in Patterson. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Eric Foner, John H. Franklin,
Louis R. Harlan, Stanley N. Katz, Leon Litwack, C. Vann Woodward and Mary Frances Berry,
Patterson. Although the brief bears these historians' names and, more relevant for purposes of litiga-
tion, their reputations, it is clearly a lawyer's document rather than a scholarly venture. Foner's
ambivalent, nuanced, and tentative treatment of the issue in his scholarly work stands in sharp con-
trast to the unambiguous assertions advanced in the amicus curiae brief that he signed; a brief that
maintains, among other things, that "[i]t will conclusively demonstrate that the Act was intended by
its framers . . . to protect the civil rights of both blacks and whites, notwithstanding [the identity of
the source of the violation]." Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
71. For insightful explorations of this subject, see Haskell & Levinson, Academic Freedom and
Expert Witnesses: Historians in the Sears Case, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1629 (1988); Kelly, Clio and the
Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 119; Powell, supra note 9; Wiecek, Clio as Hos-
tage: The United States Supreme Court and the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W.L. REV. 227 (1988).
72. R. HOS'rADTER, THE PROGRESSIVE HIsTORIAN 465 (1968) ("[Alt their best, the interpretive
historians have gone to the past with some passionate concern for the future; and somehow. . .they
have produced from the inner tensions of their minds an equipoise that enable them to superimpose
upon their commitment a measure of detachment about the past, even to reconcile themselves to hav-
ing knowledge without power.").
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own proper role in the process of adjudication since "[w]hether the courts
should be bound by the 'original intent' of a constitutional amendment is
a political, not historical question."113 Freed of burdens he has the good
sense to disown, Professor Foner has produced an admirable study that
will now itself become part of the ongoing struggle over Reconstruction.
73. P. 256.
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